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reviews
tive forms. She also ignores the fact
that his later works abound in the
pathetic
fallacy, engulfing
and
obscuring external reality in personal
emotion . This imbalance is evident in
some of Ruskin's sketches of the
1870s, which Corradini mentions in
passing. She explains Ruskin's etymologizing and its contemporary
analogues, but apparently accepts his
assumption that words have natural
origins and that a word's "original"
meaning is the true one. Her analysis
might have benefited from Derrida's
"White Mythology", among other
works. While Corradini notes that
Ruskin's ideal of adjectival accuracy
influenced the Decadents, who abandoned his moralism, she might have
mentioned that his aesthetic, combining dynamism and stasis, anticipates
Vorticism.
Ezra Pound
shares
Ruskin's desire to harmonize fact and
insight and to promote international
literary standards through close reading .
ROBERT CASILLO
University of Miami

Liberalism and
Democracy
By Norberto Bobbio.
Translated by Martin Ryle and Kate
Soper. New York: Verso, 1990.

Though Bobbio says that "liberalism and democracy have never been
radically antithetical" (73), the bulk
of this text, rightly concerns the border warfare that has raged and ever
will rage between the partisans of the
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individual (liberals) and those of
society (democrats). Beginning in the
ancient world where individual
rights were essentially unknown,
Bobbio traces, in a bare ninety pages
and seventeen chapters, the encounters of society with those who defend
the right of the individual against the
weight of society. His text covers,
among other things, Hobbes, Locke,
and natural rights theory, Kant's hostility to state paternalism, the uneasiness of Alexis de Tocqueville and
John Stuart Mill about the tyranny of
the majority, the complications arising out of the encounter of socialism
and democracy, as well as the problems raised by the appearance of the
popular and democratic authoritarian state.
The modern version of the conflict
between the individual (liberalism)
and society (democracy) may be seen
in the impossibility of reconciling the
contradictory ideals displayed in the
1789 political slogan: liberte, egalite,
and fraternite. The problem of reconciling liberty-with
its inherent
recognition of the right of each person to rise to his/ her own chosen
level (and equality) with its demand
that before the race begins, everyone
must be brought to the same level-is
the prime meridian across which
stare Rousseau, Mazzini, socialism
and other leveling forces on the one
side, and Montesquieu, Cavour, de
Tocqueville, and defenders of the
individual on the other. How could
one ever come to an agreement that
everything practical had been done
for equality and that the starting pistol could then be fired? Worse, how
could one ever come to an agreement
that everything had been done to
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bring the many to the starting gate, if
some still persisted in choosing ludicrous life goals: mere wealth for one
and going on the bum for another?
But the struggle between the liberal and the democrat was not always
over economics. It can be traced back
to the determination
to stand out
from the crowd, the moral right to be
different that is symbolized in the
clash of Socrates and Athens. As
noted by de Tocqueville, and later,
Weber, Kafka, and perhaps Foucault,
the question was and still remains:
of its size
will the demos-because
and its suspicion of inequality, difference, and quality-overwhelm
liberty with its suspicion of the many, of
homogeneity, and the organizational
man . The liberal asks: "Will the world
be so homogenized by the time the
race starts that no one will be interested in, or have the moral resources
to be, different?" The democrat asks:
"Do the community and its traditions
not have some rights against the odd,
disruptive, menacing-and
unanswerable-'why'
of the pest and the
eccentric?"
In this sense, the conflict pits the
democrat's faith that the many can be
brought to share the interests of the
few against the liberal' s suspicion
that a state capable of such an
achievement could only be an Ethical
State like that of Gentile. In nineteenth-century
Italy, this debate
between liberalism and democracy
was played out, as Bobbio notes, in
the struggle between the ideals of
Cavour on the one hand and Mazzini
on the other . For the liberal Cavour,
the question was primarily one of
limiting the state and defending the
right of the individual
to pursue

interests outside the state, which the
majority might find objectionable.
For the republican Mazzini, the issue
was how the educational role of the
state to shape its citizens could be
fulfilled by a minimalist state. As
Bobbio notes, the issue became a
drama in real life when Mazzini
seized power in Rome in 1848 and
had to confront the liberal French
Foreign Minister, de Tocqueville,
whose hostility "sealed the fate of the
Roman republic" (71).
Though Bobbio does not note it, it
was this same confrontation between
liberalism and democracy that was to
plague the Italian state right into the
Giolittian
period
and beyond.
Indeed, the question became all the
more complicated when Giolitti, the
heir of Cavour's liberal state, found
that he had to defend liberty and its
merely procedural rules against a
majority hostile to liberty and controlled by the Black International or
the Red. How does one play by the
rules and defend liberty against an
illiberal population? It is a question
one suspects President Yeltsin will
soon have to answer again.
Since the rise of socialism,
Marxism, and other mass political
movements, but especially since the
industrial revolution transformed the
globe, the debate between liberalism
and democracy has tended (recently
in the works of Hayek and Nozick,
for example) to center on a defense of
the minimal state to protect economic, property, and acquisitive rights of
the few. In other words, the conflict
between the one and the few against
the many has lost its Socratic flavor
and has focused on the right of the
few to consume. The question that
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Bobbio raises-and
as he notes, it
was a question raised earlier in the
debate between Einaudi and Croceis to what extent is this economicright
essential to the moral right of liberalism's defense against democracy?
This is no easy question: If a person
has decided that wealth is the good
that he or she above all else wishes to
pursue, what moral right does the
puritan have to say this is wrong?
Inasmuch as the many poor will
always resent the few that are rich,
how is one to distinguish legitimate
moral
resentment
from
the
Nietzschean ressentiment of the lowminded?
This dilemma is only apparently
made easier by the fact that today
wealth is as powerful a threat to liberty as the masses ever were; for
today wealth can pave the globe, buy
elections, or procure nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons for entire
nations of fundamentalist kamikazes.
In such a world, it becomes plain that
liberalism and democracy require regulation. But by whom?
Bobbio' s answer is that the two
regimes-liberalism
and democracy- must learn to accommodate
each other and become tense allies .
To such a complex question, one
should not expect an answer any
more definite, though one wishes
Bobbio had spent more time on the
necessity of the debate between liberalism and democracy rather than on
explaining the various forms of that
debate. After all, what will the
world's fate be if ever an evil, hypnotic, and wealthy liberal does wed
the elusive demos? To put the issue in
classical terms, liberty requires both
Socrates and Aristophanes,
the
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philosopher and the city. For only by
recognizing that theory and practice,
philosophy and rhetoric each have
their claims and that liberty cannot
survive the domination of either one
or the other, can we understand the
importance of the dialogue and the
conflict between liberalism
and
democracy.
EDMUND E. JACOBITII
Southern Illinois University
at Edwardsville

II Sublime: Teorie
estetiche nell'lnghilterra
def Settecento
By Samuel H. Monk.
Translated by Rachele Garattini.
Introduction by Giuseppe Sertoli.
Milan: Marietti, 1991.

Samuel Holt Monk (1902-1981)
published The Sublime: A Study of
Critical Theories in XVIII-Century
England in 1935 when interest in the
subject was at its lowest ebb in two
hundred years . Academic scholarship
paid little attention to the sublime,
and no modern school of poetry or
criticism had found any use for it.
Nor did Monk succeed in resuscitating the concept, though when a
revival did happen-in
the 1960shis study was republished and honored as a trailblazer. This Italian
translation of a classic work in the
"history of ideas" is a testimony to its
continuing value.
Monk's special virtue was to trace
the concept of the Longinian sublime
from its humble beginnings as a side
issue in neoclassicism to its thunder-

